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THE FEELING OF UNREALITY.
BY FREDERIC H. PACKARD, M,D.,
(McLean Hospital, Waverky, Mass )
UNDER this head may be included all those symptoms
arising from the loss of the feeling of reality, whether it be
in the field of consciousness relating to the outside world or
to one's own physical or mental personality. Wernicke l
has spoken of these different fields as the allopsychic, the
somatopsychic, and the autopsychic. As we shall see
later, this loss of feeling of reality may be limited to one
field or may extend to all three fields.
Despite the frequency of this symptom in various psy-
choses, very little attention has been given to it until the
last few years. Its recognition is not new, however, for
over thirty years ago Krieshaber * described cases pre-
senting this symptom, and nearly fifteen years ago Cotard *
described this same symptom. The authors of various
textbooks on psychiatry with the exception of Wernicke
have given little or no space to this symptom, or when they
have considered it at all have classed it with the so-called
hypochondriacal delusions.
Quite recently a considerable amount of interest has
arisen concerning this symptom, and Pick, Foerster, Alter,
Juliusberger, Storch, Janet, and Deny and Camus have writ-
ten papers describing carefully studied cases and offering
explanations of the symptom. All these cases show this
feeling of unreality in one or more of the three fields men-
tioned. In all these cases objective examinations of the
various sensations showed little. Janet,* who made very
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•Krieshaber: La Nevropathte Ciribro-iardiaque, 1873.
• Cotard: " Du desire des negations," and " Perte de la vision mentale
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careful and extensive examinations in his cases, found no
disorder of cutaneous, muscle, or visceral sensibility. He
did find, however, a tendency on the part of the patient to
neglect agreeable or painful impressions. Alter,1 in one of
his cases, found some inconstant anesthesias and analgesias.
On the whole, I think it is fair to say that so far no real
demonstrable disorders of organic sensations have been
demonstrated.
Concerning the explanation of this symptom all agree that
at the present time too little is known about it to come to
any definite conclusion. However, some hypothetical
explanations have been advanced. " Storch claims that
the feeling of reality of external objects and the projection
into space depend upon the association of muscle sensations
with sense perceptions." 2 The majority of observers
agree with him in this and explain these symptoms upon
that basis, Foerster,' for example, thinking that the change
is primarily in an insufficient valuation of organic sensations
and secondarily in a disorder of the consciousness of the
external world. Pick4 considered it an alteration in the
feeling of recognition. Janet5 differs in his hypothesis
from the others. He calls it a " psycholeptic crisis " and
points out that the onset of this symptom is frequently
sudden. He also mentions, in connection with these pa-
tients during the crises, what he calls the " feeling of in-
completion " in regard to action, perception, and emotion:
" The mind does not carry out its processes to their normal
completion." In his tentative explanation of these symp-
toms he suggests that mental activity may be divided
into two classes of operations; the first or simple one where
•Alter, quoted by Hoch: " A Review of Some Recent Papers upon
the Loss of the Feeling of Reality and Kindred Symptoms," Psychological
Bulletin, II, No. 7, p. 236, 1905.
!Hoch: Loc. cit., p. 236.
' Foerster: " Ein Fall von Elementarer Allgememer Sotnatopsychose
(Afunktion der Somatopsyche)," Mottatsschrift fur Psychiatric und
Neurologic, XIV, p. 205.
'Pick: "ZurPathologie des Bekanntheitsgeffihls (Bekanntheitsquali-
tat)," Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1903, XXII, p. 2.
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" the operations bear upon abstract ideas, general ideas,
imaginary conceptions and representations, and even upon
the reproduction of past events"; the second and more
difficult where the operations " bear upon events which
are present and real and produce a knowledge of complex
events which are actually taking place in the universe at
the moment; also where they produce reactions in us which
are likewise perfectly real acts, that is to say, acts capable
of determining modifications in the world as it exists."
The first class of mental operations is easy for two reasons:
" Primarily because they are a repetition of syntheses
previously achieved, and secondarily because they deal
with abstract elements few in number and enormously
simplified." " The second class of operations, on the
contrary, is difficult not only because they demand new
syntheses but particularly because they act upon rich and
infinitely complex elements." Assuming this he divides
psychological operations into two groups, a higher, which
calls for greater tension of the nervous system and includes
the functions of the real, and the lower, which calls for less
tension and embraces the abstract indifferent functions
bearing upon the past and the imaginary rather than upon
the present and the real. When this symptom is present it
is to be explained by a loss of the function of this higher
group, which in turn, he says, may be ascribed to a lowering
of cerebral activity.
Quite recently Hoch * has written an exhaustive and
valuable review of the recent literature on this subject, one
which entailed a large amount of critical reading. From it
I have drawn freely in writing this introduction.
While the above review is incomplete, it seems adequate
for the purpose of this paper since it is not so much my
desire to criticise or refute what other observers have said as
to offer for consideration some ideas which seem to follow
the study of a case presenting this feeling of unreality.
It may be said that this is only one of many similar cases
which have been observed at this hospital. They have
1
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shown this symptom in varying degrees of intensity, from
its very mildest forms where " things do not look just
right " to the most marked forms, where there is a complete
" dilire. de negation."
Besides possibly some slight diminution of pain sensation
and some fleeting inability to estimate distance by sight,
nothing has been observed which would point definitely to
any disturbance of organic sensations.
This symptom has occurred chiefly in involution psy-
choses, sometimes in manic-depressive depressions, and
occasionally in dementia precox.
The following is an abstract of the case referred to above:
A young woman, thirty-four years old, with no heredity,
comes from a well-to-do family, has had good educational
advantages, is a musician and an artist. At twelve years
of age she had more or less continual pain in the back,
with frequent acute attacks of severe pain which at a later
period were found to b6 due to renal calculus. Mentally
she was bright, active, perfectly normal, until twenty years
of age, at which time she began to feel discouraged at being
kept back in her ambitions by her physical condition.
She had visited many physicians who had made as many
different diagnoses of her trouble. It was finally said to
be hysteria. She rather suddenly became markedly de-
pressed, sat about unoccupied, almost without moving,
face without expression, " wooden." When spoken to she
would sometimes obey requests, but showed no sign in
her face of having heard them. She was sent to an insane
hospital. There she gradually began to move about a
little more and suddenly, three months after the onset, she
awoke one morning decidedly happy, began to do many
things, and was very energetic, but her exhilaration did
not extend much beyond what might be called normal
bounds. The pain in her back continued as before, but she
was weU mentally until three years later when, twenty-three
years of age, 1894, a second depression came on suddenly,
presenting the same characteristics as the first. Unlike
the first, however, it wore off very gradually and as she
became a little freer in her movements and talk she expressed
many depressive ideas. At the end of a year all mental
symptoms had gradually disappeared, but she was not as
happy as after the first attack. She resumed her normal
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activity, managing household and financial affairs. In
December, 1903, although relieved from the old pain by an
operation performed the previous year, she felt tired
physically. She could not be made to rest as she said it
was only natural fatigue. Two weeks later she felt so
weak and exhausted that she was persuaded to go to bed.
Within an hour she suddenly got depressed, said it was
as if something had suddenly struck her in the head and
gone all over her, had destroyed her life, killed her mentally;
she was nothing but a body without a soul. Almost at once
she began to say that she could not see people as formerly.
When she looked at her mother, although she did not look
right, she could not say what the change was, and concluded
that the trouble was with herself. For about two months
she sat about motionless, with immobile face. Then for
three months she cried and moaned a good deal. After
this she went to the country where her slowness of move-
ment gradually wore off and she employed herself planting,
hoeing, and weeding in a garden. She talked very little
except to say that she was dead mentally and could never
get well. She came to the McLean Hospital in March, 1905.
She was depressed and complained of some inadequacy,
but foremost of all was a feeling of unreality. She said
she had lost everything. She dated it from the time she
went to bed in December when she said " the crash came,
and ever since then things have gone farther and farther
away." Characteristic utterances were: " I am nothing
but a body sitting about without a soul." " Things about
are like dreams." " This place is more of a dream than
the last." " Nothing seems real until I get back to the
time before I went to bed." " Everything I see and hear
seems unreal." " I don't see nor hear." She modified
this by saying: " I don't see or hear in a way; I could walk
in the streets and find my way, could recognize people
whom I know and all that, but yet I can't see." " I see
the trees and yet I don't see them; they don't seem real
and yet I know that they must be because they are the
trees I always saw." Such were some of her utterances
at admission.
During the seven months which have elapsed since
entrance the patient has continued depressed, expressed
a good deal of inadequacy, and except for a little sewing
and writing has been unable to occupy herself to any extent.
She speaks of a difficulty in thinking and in the pages
which she has written in attempting to analyze and describe
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her condition her sentences often show confusion of thought.
Foremost of all has continued this feeling of unreality, and
she continues to say such things as " I cannot see, nor hear,
nor smell. I heard music the other day for just the flash
of a moment only to appreciate that I could not hear it.
I see the flowers only to find that I have lost the power
to see them. I smell the lilacs but yet I don't smell them."
At another time, when made to count fingers to prove that
she could see all right, she said, " Yes, I can see it, but only
for the moment; I can't associate it with the past." Or
again: " I see the outside of things but I can't get the
spirit of them; I see with my eyes, but not with my intelli-
gence." " It is-as if I were dumb, I can't sense things."
" I have lost that which gave me my comprehension and
connection and which made me Miss ." " I would
be suspicious of people if I had to start out by myself now
because I could not comprehend them. There's no longer
any comprehension out of myself; what little is left comes
out of my memory." " I can't comprehend the pattern
on the carpet sufficiently to know whether it is one I like
or not." Again she says, " I can't remember," and when
facts were given to show that she did remember she said,
" I remember with my head but not with my feelings."
Again she said to the physician, " If by some miracle I
should get well to-night and you should come in the morning,
I would see you for the first time; I would see you with my
intelligence, and my feelings would appreciate and under-
stand you." The patient also says, " I am only a body
without a soul," but more often she says that it is not her
body, " I know it's good muscle, flesh, and bone, good in the
physiological sense as a body, but it's not my body; this is
not I." She tries to explain it figuratively by saying,
" When I went to bed and the crash came, every molecule
of my body was turned and twisted and changed until
this thing was left." While she often says that the houses
and streets and outside things look different, do not look
real, she is for the most part able to correct these statements
and explain them by saying the trouble is with her,— her
inability to see, hear, etc.
Various tests show that the patient has no real visual
or auditory disorder, and no disorder of smell. The sense
of touch is unimpaired, as is the muscle sense. At times
the sense of pain has seemed diminished, but this has not been
consistent. Likewise, objectively, the patient's memory
is good.
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In addition to the above the patient showed some symp-
toms which I have not seen mentioned in connection with
these cases and which I wish to emphasize. It was fre-
quently noticed in conversing with the patient that from
time to time she asked the physician to stop and repeat
what he had said, and then would cover her eyes and appar-
ently try to think very hard for several moments before
she could understand what the statement meant. Again
it was occasionally noticed that when physicians or nurses
entered the room it took a moment or two for her to recog-
nize them fully.
In this connection some simple apperception experiments
were tried. The first involved the simplest kind of apper-
ception, that of simple relation. Six cards were given to
the patient upon which were written such nouns as fire, ice,
etc. Six other cards were given to the patient upon which
were written in red ink adjectives which obviously qualified
the six nouns, as hot, cold, etc. The patient was asked to
put together as rapidly as possible the nouns and adjectives
which most obviously belonged together. The first set was
done correctly in fifty-five seconds, the second in thirty
seconds, and the third in twenty-five seconds.
Next the patient was asked to put together in a similar
way cards on which were written nouns where the relation
was one of comparison. Theoretically this required a
slightly more complex apperception process than the first
experiment. The patient did each of the three sets, twelve
cards in a set, correctly in twenty-five seconds. This gain
in time seemed to be due, partly at least, to the increased
familiarity with the method of experiment. It may be
added that the normal time had been estimated by experi-
ment at about twelve seconds for each set.
Finally the patient was given some simple stories to read
aloud, and then asked to give the gist in her own words,
bringing out the point. The first story was the following:
" A cowboy from Arizona came to San Francisco with his
dog which he left at a dealer's while he purchased a new
suit of clothes. Dressed finely, he went to the dog, whistled
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to him, called him by name and patted him. But the dog
would have nothing to do with him in his new hat and coat,
but gave a mournful howl. Coaxing was of no effect, so
the cowboy went away and donned his old garments,
whereon the dog immediately showed his wild joy on seeing
his master as he thought he ought to be."
She read it at a normal rate with apparently perfect
understanding, but when asked to reproduce it she could
not give a single sentence and explained that she would
have to take it and read each sentence by itself in order to
understand the individual sentences even, and added that
it would take several readings to get the point of the story.
She was allowed to read it as she liked, and said (reading):
" ' A cowboy' — [to herself] — let me see, that's one of
those men out West who takes care of cows — [read-
ing] —' A cowboy from Arizona came to San Francisco with
his dog ' — [to herself] — came to San Francisco, that is,
he took the train and went to San Francisco and he had
bis dog with him. [Reading] ' A cowboy from Arizona
came to San Francisco with his dog which he left at a deal-
er's while he purchased a new suit of clothes.' " After
some moments' thinking she said, " Oh, yes; he left his dog
with another man while he went to buy clothes."
In this way the patient went through the whole story,
stopping and forcing up associations, repeating many times
the first part and adding on point by point until finally
she finished and reproduced the story as follows: " A cow-
boy went to a store and bought some clothes. His dog did
not know him, but when he put on his old clothes the dog
knew him." When she had finished, she added, " I can't
get it into my head unless I visualize the thing; I can't
understand it with my head; the way I got it was by seeing
a man and a dog and a store."
Several other stories were tried and the patient went
through the same performance. She was unable to get the
point unless allowed to read it over and over again and
repeat out loud various simple associations and get visual
images of the different parts of the story.
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From the above experiments it would seem that the
patient's apperceptive function for apperceiving simple
relations and even simple comparisons is still intact but
works with some difficulty. When it comes to the more
complex synthetic and analytic apperception as is needed
in the reproduction of the stories, there is a much more
marked impairment of the function, and unless a great and
abnormal effort is made the stories are not understood at
all. We have then what seems to be a demonstrable diffi-
culty of apperception, and upon this I wish to lay emphasis,
because of its possible relation to the feeling of unreality.
Let me say that I have tried the same experiments on a
number of other patients who were equally depressed and
on some who were markedly retarded even, but none of
whom showed any indication of a feeling of unreality. The
results were entirely different. In every case the patients
were able to give the points of stories well. Even retarded
ones, although often reproducing the stories very slowly,
in the end brought out the point correctly.
Before going further let us consider briefly what we mean
by apperception. Baldwin l defines it as " the process of
attention in so far as it involves interaction between the
presentation of the object attended to, on the one hand,
and the total preceding conscious content together with
preformed mental dispositions, on the other hand."
Some other psychologists differ somewhat in their defini-
tion, but, whatever differences there may be among them,
all agree that for apperception the present impression must
call up certain old associations and be assimilated with them.
In other words, if the present impression does not call up
such necessary associations from the memory residua there
can be no apperception.
Psychology tells us further that the feeling of familiarity is
a composite feeling which depends upon the affective accom-
paniments of the elements of the previous impression which
is called up by the present perception. If the present
perception does not call up these elements of the previous
1
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impression, the affective accompaniments of these elements
will be lacking and there will be no feeling of familiarity.
Things which we have never seen nor heard of before look
unfamiliar because they do not call up all the necessary
associations. In these cases which we are considering, the
unreality is in connection with things which they have seen
and heard of many times. May it not be possible that when
the necessary associations are not called up in connection
with things with which we know we are familiar, the result
is not a feeling of unfamiliarity but a '' feeling of unreality ?''
If we accept this view, it seems possible to relate a feeling
of unreality to an association disorder, and since we have
seen that apperception is dependent upon associations,
a way is opened to relate the patient's feeling of unreality
to her disorder of apperception. Thus I am led to the
hypothesis that the feeling of unreality is due to a disorder
of apperception, which in turn is due to an association diffi-
culty of some kind.
Let us test such a theory by applying it to the various
symptoms presented by our patient.
In the first place she has said, " I cannot see," but she
modifies and explains this by saying, " I can see with my
eyes but not with my intelligence." " I see it, but only for
the moment; I can't associate it with the past." " I see
the outside of things but I can't get the spirit of them;
it is as if I were dumb; I cannot sense things." Again she
said, " I have lost that which gave me my comprehension
and connection and which made me Miss ."
Are not these the very statements which one would expect
from a person whose apperception was interfered with
through an association disorder?
In regard to the feeling of unreality relating to the out-
side world our patient at times says that things look unreal,
and many patients are consistent in such statements; the
houses, trees, and people do not look real. Here again we
get just what our psychology teaches us to expect with an
apperception disorder. The sight of the houses, trees, and
people does not call up the necessary associations for their
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apperception, and the lack of those associations causes the
feeling of unreality in regard to them. This feeling of
unreality relating to the outside world is very closely related
to the feeling of um-eality relating to the patient's own
sight, hearing, smell, etc. Indeed, it seems to me to be the
same thing made subjective when patients say, " I cannot
see," and made objective when they say the thing does not
look real. The patient above described at times, making the
trouble objective, says, " The trees do not seem real," but
again, making it subjective, says, " I don't see them, " and
adds, " I know they must be real because they are the trees
I always saw." This same shifting from objective to sub-
jective was noted during the earlier part of the patient's
illness, when she said that her mother did not look right,
but finally concluded that the trouble was with herself.
But to go back to the feeling of unreality relating to the
outside world, we find that taken alone it seems possible to
explain it by the above hypothesis as due to the failure of
the immediate perception to call up the necessary asso-
ciations. If we admit that it is the same condition as that
manifested by statements " I cannot see," etc., being in
one case made objective, in the other subjective, we have
another reason for considering it due to the same cause.
Now, in regard to the feeling of unreality relating to the
body, as, for example, when a patient says, " This is not my
hand, it is not a real hand," we have a condition which may
at first seem quite apart from those already discussed. It is
not difficult to imagine, however, that when the hand is
looked at or when attention is called to it by other than
visual sensations, just as with outside things, the present
impression does not call up the normal associations, in which
case psychology leads us to expect a feeling of unreality or,
just what we often get, " It is not a real hand." The state-
ment, " It is not my hand," may be simply an elaboration
of " It is not a real hand," or it may be a part of what I will
take up later in attempting to explain the statements such
as '' This is not I." In the same way it is possible to explain
the feeling of unreality in regard to other parts of the body.
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Such an explanation at least allows the organic sensations
as such to remain normal as we have shown they seem to do.
Theoretically, then, we see that the feeling of unreality
relating to the outside world and to the body is really
the same thing and can all be explained by the same
hypothesis.
A complaint which the above patient has not made, but
which is quite common in such cases, and which is very
pronounced in another similar case which has been under
my observation, is that solid objects look fiat. It is well
known that as the distance of a solid object from the subject
increases, the impression of solidity diminishes, so that
beyond a certain distance all angles of the binocular parallax
disappear and the body appears flat, unless the impression
of that object arouses elements of earlier percepts which
are assimilated with the new impression.1 Some observa-
tions made upon the patient referred to are very interesting.
When a solid object was held near enough to his face so that
a different image was projected on the retina of each eye, the
patient recognized that it was solid, but when held at such a
distance that there was no such difference of images on the
two retinae, he said it looked flat. This was tried with
several different objects with the same result. The asso-
ciations necessary for the recognition of solidity did not
come up as with a normal person, and consequently the
objects looked flat to him. Whether or not the above
hypothesis is true, it seems significant that so many of these
conditions can be explained by it.
We have left to consider such statements as " This is not
I." The explanation of this involves merely an extended
application of our hypothesis. In the preceding considera-
tions it had to do with the explanation of the feeling of
unreality in its relation to the more concrete things, the
body, the outside world, etc. Here it has to do with the
feeling of unreality in its relation to a more general and
complex thing, the " consciousness of self." It is still an
apperception difficulty but the apperceptive elements are
1
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vastly more complex. There is a difficulty in associating
the present, taken in its larger meaning, with the past.
In speaking of such cases James says," The present thought
of the patient is cognitive of both the old me and the new, so
long as its memory holds good. Only within that objective
sphere which formerly lent itself so simply to the judgment
of recognition and of egoistic appropriation strange per-
plexities have arisen. The present and the past both seen
therein will not unite." 1
In another place he says, " Masses of new sensations
hitherto foreign to the individual," etc., and then goes on:
" At the outset these stand in contrast with the old familiar
me, as a strange, often astonishing and abhorrent thou." 3
Again he says; '' One can compare the state of the patient
to nothing so well as to that of a caterpillar, which, keeping
all its caterpillar's ideas and remembrances, should suddenly
become a butterfly with a butterfly's senses and sensations.
Between the old and the new state, between the first self,
that of the caterpillar, and the second self, that of the
butterfly, there is a deep scission, a complete rupture. The
new feelings find no anterior series to which they can knit
themselves on; the patient can neither interpret nor use
them; he does not recognize them; they are unknown.
Hence two conclusions, the first which consists in his saying,
' / no longer am,' the second, somewhat later, which con-
sists in his saying, ' / am another person.1" s
If we may be allowed to use a te~minology somewhat
different from that employed by James, the above is con-
sistent with our own theory that " consciousness of self "
depends upon a complex apperceptive process in which the
present is always assimilated with the representations of
the past whether these be focal or marginal in consciousness.
To put it the other way around, if the present cannot be
assimilated with the past there is a loss of the consciousness
of self. This is just what happens in these cases showing
1
 James: Principles of Psychology, I, p. 37§.
s
 W. Griesinger, quoted by James: Ibid., p. 37<>-
3
 H. Taine, quoted by James: Ibid.
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a feeling of unreality. The products of their present im-
pressions will not fit with the past, and how can we expect
them to? Things are presented to patients who have
not only lost a part of their apperceptive function (as
shown in the first part of our consideration), but who have
to analyze this imperfect apperceptive product with an
analytical machine which is also minus part of its apper-
ceptive function. One can scarcely conceive of a more
vicious circle. The products of impressions coming through
such a distorted mechanism are so different from those
which resulted in the past when the mental mechanism was
normal that they cannot be assimilated with the past and
consequently cannot be understood. Such a changed
condition is comparable to the change of the caterpillar
to the butterfly. The new products " find no anterior
series to which they can knit themselves on," and we come
logically to the same conclusions: " I no longer am." " I
am another person." " This is not I."
